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RECENT CASES
Bankruptcy-N. L. R. B. Back Pay Award as Provable ClaimN. L. R. B. ordered Shoe Company to reinstate certain employees with
back pay. Before Circuit Court affirmed this order,' Shoe Company filed
petition in bankruptcy and thereafter was adjudicated a bankrupt. N. L.
R. B. filed claim for the back pay award, but Referee2 denied it was a
provable debt. District Court upheld Referee's holding, and N. L. R. B.
appeals. Held, reversed and remanded. A back pay award is a provable
debt entitled to priority as wages, and is properly filed by N. L. R. B.
National Labor Relations Board v. Killorem, Trustee of Hamilton-Brown
Shoe Company, 9 L. R. R. 71 (C. C. A. 8th, 1941).
According to the Court, the back pay award, being an obligation imposed by statute, constituted a claim under an implied contract, and was
within the fourth of nine general classes of provable claims enumerated
in § 63 of the Bankruptcy Act.3 But where there is no remedy in assumpsit or other action ex contractu, an obligation imposed by law is not provable. 4 That any contract remedy exists for the collection of back pay
awards seems improbable. None is expressly provided in the statute. As
between employee and empolyer, the award is not based on any breach
of contract, but is issued solely "to effectuate the policies of the Act, and
is not a private right". 5 As between N. L. R. B. and employer, procedure for enforcing the award is founded, not on any underlying contractual obligation to the Board, but in the contempt process of the Federal Courts., Moreover, having established provability on the theory of
i. Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. N. L. R. B., 104 F. (2d) 49 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939).
In the matter of Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co., 2 Labor Cases 666 (E.D. Mo.
1940), Note (1941) 89 U. OF PA. L. Ray. 648, 658, (1940) 40 CoL. L. REv. 1272.
3. 52 STAT. 873 (1938), II U. S. C. A. § 103 (Supp. 1940). "Debts of the bank2.

rupt may be proved and allowed against his estate which are founded upon . . . (4)

an open account, or a contract express or implied."
4. In re Paramount Publix Corp., 8 Fed. Supp. 644 (S. D. N. Y. 1934) (statutory

remedy for patent infringement) ; Lane v. Industrial Com'r of N. Y., 54 F. (2d) 338
(C. C. A. 2d, 1931) (award of workmen's compensation); In re Southern Steel Co.,
183 Fed. 498 (N. D. Ala. igio) (statutory penalty for cutting trees). The provability
of alimony awards is in dispute. Note (1925) 39 A. L. R. 1283. Cf. Brown v. O'Keefe,
Receiver, 3oo U. S. 598 (1937) ; Cunningham v. Feinsilver, 6 F. (2d) 92 (D. C. Mass.
1925).
5.See Amalgamated Utility Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co., 309 U. S. 261,
267' (1940) ; N. L. R. B. v. Hearst et at., lO2 F. (2d) 658, 664 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939) ;
Agwilines, Inc. v. N. L. R. B., 87 F. (2d) 146, 150 (C. C. A. 5th, 1936). The quotation in the text is from the Fourth Annual Report, N. L. R. B. (1939), as reprinted in
i C. C. H. Labor Law Service (3d ed. 1940) 5232.
6. Section io of the National Labor Relations Act (49 STAT. 453 (I935), 29 U. S.
C. A. § i6o (Supp. i94o)) outlines the manner in which the Board is to exercise its
powers. After deciding there has been discrimination warranting affirmative action,
the Board makes an award of reinstatement with or without back pay. This award
is subject to review in the federal district or circuit courts. If the employer refuses
to comply with the decree, the Board may petition the federal court having jurisdiction to order its enforcement. It then becomes the court's duty to inquire into the
propriety and legality of the decree. Once the court has affirmed the decree, further
failure to comply with it is contempt, and is dealt with as such. BuFFoRD, THE WAGNER Acr (19i1) §§ 445-482.
Though in some instances the courts have spoken of a quasi-contract, whereby a
legal obligation is imposed on the employer to deal collectively with his employees, as
having been assumed by the Act, this has not been applied as a theory on which the
Board may sue for collection of its back pay awards. See N. L. R. B. v. Piqua
Munising Wood Prod. Co., iog F. (2d) 552, 556 (C. C. A. 6th, z94o).
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an implied contractual obligation public in character and collectable by
the Board alone, the Court, for priority purposes, deserted its previous
thesis and ruled the award was not a debt owing the United States, but
was "constructively earned" wages, which, however, the constructive wageearners were powerless to collect. In order to resolve these inconsistendes, the Court gave the Board the status of trustee for the employees. 7
An amendment to the Bankruptcy Act, similar to that providing for the
provability of Workmen's Compensation awards, s has been suggested as
a sound solution of the problem.9 It is questionable if such an amendment would be desirable. If the primary object of bankruptcy is equitably
to distribute the estate among creditors, 0 it would seem that those who
have given a quid pro quo should recover the greatest possible portion of
their claims. Employees who are to receive back pay awards have rendered no services; it would be unjust for them to share equally with employees who have. Furthermore, the bankrupt employer-guilty of past
unfair practices--can "sin no more", and there is no conscionable reason
for compelling guiltless creditors to make his atonement.
Bankruptcy-Priority Rights of City for Sales Tax Owed by
Bankrupt Retailer as Collector from Purchasers-Bankrupt, a vendor
in New York City, had collected some of the money from purchasers under
the Sales Act,1 and had failed to collect the remainder. The city claimed
priority for the entire amount of the tax due under the Bankruptcy Act.2
Held, (one judge dissenting) 1 the Sales Act intended the vendor to be the
one obligated, and therefore the true taxpayer, and the city is entitled to
priority. The City of New York v. Feiring,9 U. S. L. WEEK 4352 (U. S.
1941).

The Bankruptcy Act 4 gives priority of payment to the United States,
or any state or sub-division thereof, for all taxes legally due and 'owing
by the bankrupt. The question of what constitute such taxes has been
before the courts several times, and has been limited to mean only taxes
assessed upon the bankrupt, and not those collected by him from others
for the government. 5 Thus the only question before the court in this case
7. This rationalization was strongly criticized by the dissenting judge. See instant
case at 73.
8. 48 STAT. 923 (1934), 1i U. S. C. A. § 103 (a) (6) (Supp. 1940). Compare
Lane v. Industrial Com'r of N. Y., 54 F. (2d) 338 (C. C. A. 2d, 193) (decided before
amendment), with In re Dearborn Mfg. Corp., 92 F. (2d) 417 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937),
writ of certiorari denied in Klipstein v. Davidowicz, 3o3 U. S. 648 (1938) (decided
after amendment).
9. See 40 COL. L. REv. 1272, 1276.

io. See Wilson v. City Bank, i7 Wall. 473, 480 (U. S. 1873) ; In re Leslie, iig

Fed. 406, 410 (N. D. N. Y. i9o3).
i. Local Law No. 24 (published as Local Law No. 25, Local Laws of 1934, pp.
164-175).

2. BANxKRup

AcT, § 64 (a) (4), as amended 1938, 52 STAT. 840, 874, iI U. S.

C. A. io4.
3. Justice Roberts dissented upon the grounds that the majority of the Circuit
Court of Appeals used in this case. City of New York v. Feiring, 118 F. (2d) 329
(i94i). Here the court held that as the purchaser was to pay the tax to the vendor
(Local Laws of 1934, § 2, p. i66), and as the law provided that in case he failed to
do so, the city could act directly against him (Local Laws of New York, § 8, p. 170),
the vendor was actually a collector of the tax for the city, and his obligation to them
was in the nature of a debt for which they were not entitled to priority.
4. See note 2 mupra.
5. Nolte v. Hudson Navigation Co., 8 F. (2d) 859 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925) (transportation company collected tax money from their shippers which was still not paid to
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was whether the vendor was the one taxed, or merely the collector of the
tax. The courts that have looked into the Sales Act 6 have not been
unanimous in their decisions,7 but every decision handed down by the
Supreme Court of the United States, and the New York Court of Appeals,
the only courts having final jurisdiction over this particular Act, has declared that the vendor is the one assessed." These decisions are based
not upon the wording of the act, but upon the effect it has upon the
vendor. They found that the vendor was obligated to pay the tax even
though he failed to collect any money at all from the purchaser, and even
on those sales so trifling that the comptroller had permitted the vendors
to sell without adding the tax to the purchase priceY This finding could
lead to only one conclusion--the vendor is the actual taxpayer, and the
purchaser merely reimburses him when he pays the amount of the tax
to the vendor. On a casual review of the facts the position of the vendor
appears to be that of a tax collector upon whom there is a binding duty
to collect and pay the tax, but this theory will not explain the clause
making the vendor liable for the tax upon articles whose retail value is
less than the sum fixed by the comptroller as the maximum amount that
may be sold "tax-free". The court in the instant case adopted a liberal
construction of legislative wording. The benefit to the public in allowing
priority is obvious. The money collected by the vendor goes into the city
treasury instead of the pockets of the creditors,10 and the city is saved
the enormous expense of tracing and suing the many purchasers who
have not paid, and who in many cases would owe less than the suit would
cost.

The situation was summed up by J. Lehman, ".

.

. fine spun

distinctions are here out of place. The local law provides 'the vendor
shall pay the tax,' and the city is entitled as a sovereign to priority for
such payment." 1

Constitutional Law-Federal Jurisdiction Over Dam on Tributary
of Navigable Stream-Oklahoma, seeking to enjoin the building of
Denison Dam, authorized by Congress 1 as a flood control and water
the government when they became insolvent; held, tax money was already collected,
and only claim government had was for a debt, therefore not entitled to priority);
Commonwealth of Pa. v. York Silk Mfg. Co., 192 Fed. 81 (C. C. A. 3d, 1911); In re
Northern Bank of New York, 163 App. Div. 974, 148 N. Y. S. 7o, aff'd, 212 N. Y.
6o8, io6 N. E. 749 (1914) (Collected tax money deposited in bank at time of insolvency. Court held sovereign right of priority ended when the tax was collected).
6. See note i supra.
7. In re Lazaroff, 84 F. (2d) 982 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936) and In re Goldstein, 13 F.
Supp. 991 (S. D. N. Y. 1935) the courts held the vendor was merely a tax collector,
but in New York City v. Goldstein, 299 U. S. 522 (1937) the court reversed the Lazaroff case without giving an opinion, basing their decision on Matter of Atlas Television
Co., Inc., 273 N. Y. 51, 6 N. E. (2d) 94 (1936), which permitted priority claim holding the vendor was the taxpayer.
8. New York City v. Goldstein, 299 U. S. 522 (1937) ; Matter of Atlas Television
Co., Inc., 273 N. Y. 51, 6 N. E. (2d) 94 (1936).
9. Local Laws of 1934, § 3, P. 168: "The comptroller shall . . . prescribe . . .
a schedule or schedules of the amount to be collected from the purchasers.
. .
Such schedule or schedules may provide that no tax need be collected from the purchaser upon receipts below a stated sum..
io. Matter of Atlas Television Co., Inc., 273 N. Y. 51, 6 N. E. (2d) 94 (1936).
ii. See Matter of Atlas Television Co., Inc., 273 N. Y. 51, 58, 6 N. E. (2d) 94,
96 (1936).
1. 52 STAT. 1215 (1938), 33 U. S. C. A. § 7oib (Supp. 194o).
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power project,2 alleged the Act2 to be unconstitutional and challenged the
right of the government to take Oklahoma's domain. 4 Held, (affirming
district court 5) injunction denied. Federal jurisdiction extends to nonnavigable tributaries 6 of navigable streams and the project is a valid
exercise of the commerce power.7 State of Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v.
Guy F. Atkinson Co., et al., 9 U. S. L. Week 4366 (U. S. 1941).
The commerce clause 8 gives the federal government jurisdiction over
navigable waters,9 a river being navigable in law if it can be made so in
fact at reasonable cost. 10 Although it is established that there is no constitutional power to build a dam solely for hydro-electricity," if a river
is dammed for purposes of navigation,' 2 there is no objection to selling
excess power.'8 Petitioner argued against the feasibility of such a multiple
purpose dam and asserted the preponderance of the water power purpose.' 4
The court held that it could not inquire into the motives of Congress, 5
and that the great importance of the power feature would not invalidate
the project.' 6 While the avowed purposes of the dam are flood control
(over which federal jurisdiction extends 17) and power development, there
is little doubt that it is primarily a hydro-electric project.'8 The main
contention, however, was on the extension of jurisdiction over navigable
streams to include their tributaries. Recent decisions, in order to make
federal water projects constitutionally feasable, have ignored the classic
definitions of navigability, 9 and have stretched the concept to include
2. The bill alleges inter ala that under the statutory scheme flood control and
power purposes are "inextricably and inseverably involved". Instant case 4366.
3. See note I supra.
4. The bill further alleges that backwater from the dam will inundate Ioo,ooo
acres of Oklahoma territory, about 3800 of which are owned by the state, containing
rich soil and large potential oil reserves; 39 school districts and four counties will be
deprived of much tax revenue, and the Oklahoma boundary will be obliterated for 4o
miles. Instant case 4366.
5. State of Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co. et al., 37 F. Supp.

93 (E. D. Okla. 1941).

ble.

6. "We conclude that no part of the (Red) river within Oklahoma is naviga. . ." Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U. S. 574, 591 (1922).
7. U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
8. See note 7 supra.

9. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. i (U. S. 1824) ; Gilman v. City of Phila., 7o U. S.
713, 724 (1865).

io. United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., io7 F. (2d) 769 (C. C. A.
4th, 1940), Note (1941) 39 MicH. L. Ray. 976; (1940) 5o YAti L. J. 234.
ii. State of Mo. v. Union Electric Light and Power Co., 42 F. (2d) 692, 695 (C.
D. Mo. 1930); see Ala. Power Co. v. Gulf Power Co., 283 F. 6o6, 613 (M. D. Ala.
1922).

12. Port of Seattle v. Oregon & Wash. R. R., 255 U. S. 56, 63 (1920).
This case
is partially explained in United States v. Appalachian Power Co., 311 U. S. 377, 424
(C. C. A. 4th, 2940). However, in the instant case the court admits that the effect on
navigation is but incidental. Instant case 4369.
23. United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Co., 229 U. S. 53, 73 (193).
For the right
of the government to charge for power so created, see KERmwix, FEmAL WATERPowER LEGISLATIoN (1926) 77 et seq.

14. Instant case 4367.
15. The court cited Arizona v. California, 283 U. S. 423, 455 (931).

4370.

Instant case

i6. United States v. Appalachian Power Co., 311 U. S. 377, 424
(941).

Instant

case 4370.

17. The court holds this on the authority of United States v. Appalachian Power

Co., 311 U. S. 377, 426 (1941).

Instant case 4369.

18. The court admits that flood control may be relatively of lesser importance.
Instant case 4372.

Ig. The Daniel Ball, io Wall. 557, 563 (U. S. 287o) ; United States v. Doughten,
62 F. (2d) 936, 939 (C. C. A. 4th, 1933). See Starr, Navigable Waters of ttw United
States (921) 35 HARv. L. Ray. 154.
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rivers which are neither actually navigated, 20 nor wholly navigable, 21 and
22
the holding that federal control extends to all matter affecting navigation,
has been used as the basis for asserting government control over rivers,
which, although not actually navigable, can be made so by improvement."
The court here realizes that it is on tenuous ground, 24 the instant case
being the culmination of attempts to make federal jurisdiction over interstate power plenary. Since any river in the United States can be deemed
a tributary to a navigable one, the federal government may now build
an interstate power dam on every stream. The court has ignored the
25
warning that Congress may not exercise undelegated powers indirectly,
so the time seems to be at hand for the court to disregard the fiction of
navigability and assert jurisdiction on the clearer ground of the interstate
transmission of power.28
Contempt of Court--Geographical Limitation on Summary
Power to Punish Contempts-Appellant wrongfully induced X to
drop the prosecution of a suit. Act took place over ioo miles from the
court room. Appellant cited for criminal contempt.' Held (three justices dissenting), appellant was too far from court to come within Section
268 of the Judicial Code 2 which grants summary power 3 to courts only
in cases of misbehavior in their presence or so near thereto as to obstruct
the administration of justice. Nye v. United States, 313 U. S. 33 (1941).
The decision expressly overrules Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States,
247 U. S. 402 (1918).
For forty or fifty years courts have interpreted Section 268 to mean
"so near" in a causal sense.' They considered an indirect, contemptuous
20. In Economy Light and Power Co. v. United States, 256 U. S. 113, 124 (1921),
the Des Plaines river had not been navigated for nearly a century. Sheilds, The Federal Power Act (1924) 73 U. OF PA. L. REv. I42.
21. United States v. Utah, 283 U. S. 64, 90 (1931) ; United States v. Rio Grande

Dam and Irrigation Co., 174 U. S. 69o (1899).
22. State of Mo. v. Union Electric Power Co., 42 F. (2d) 692, 695 (C. D. Mo.
1930) ; Ala. Power Co. v. Gulf Power Co., 283 F. 6o6, 613 (M. D. Ala. 1922).
23. United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 107 F. (2d) 769 (C. C. A.
4th, 1940).

24. "In authorizing it, Congress exercised all the power it possessed to control
navigation". Instant case 4369.
25. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 423 (U. S. 18ig).
26. The practical effect of this case is to overrule Utah Power and Light Co. v.
Pfost, 286 U. S. i65 (1932), which held a plant for generating electric power to be
subject to state taxation.
I. Criminal contempt: Conduct directed against the dignity and authority of the
court. It raises an issue between public and accused. 13 C. J. 6, § 5.
2. This was passed in 1831. The original was in two sections and may be found
in 4 STAT. 487 (1831), Ray. STAT. § 725, 5399 (1875). The first section is now contained in §268 of the JUDICIAL CODE, 36 STAT. 1163 (1911), 28 U. S. C. A. §385
(1928), the second in § I35 of the CRIMINAL CODE, 35 STAT. 1113 (i909), 18 U. S. C.
A. § 241 (1927). It is unfortunate that these sections have been separated; by so divorcing them from their historic environment, the act has become less intelligible and the
intent of Congress more opaque.
§268 supra, was properly construed for several years after its passage. This is
clearly shown in Ex parte Poulson, 19 Fed. Cas. 1205, No. 11,350 (C. C. E. D. Pa.
1835) ; United States v. Holmes, 26 Fed. Cas. 360, 363, No. 15,383 (C. C. E. D. Pa.
1842) (by implication) ; Ex parte Robinson, ig Wall. 5o5, 51, (U. S. 1873) ; Savin,
Petitioner, 13I U. S. 267, 276 (1889).
3. Summary power: Power to try without jury. BouviR, LAw DICrIONARY
(Baldwin's Students ed. i94o).
4. It re Brule, 71 Fed. 943 (D. C. D. Nev. 1895); It re Independent Pub. Co.,
228 Fed. 787 (D. C. D. Mont. 1915); Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247
U. S. 402 (i918) ; United States v. Craig, 266 Fed. 23o (D. C. S. D. N. Y. i92o).
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act, a derogatory newspaper article, for instance, to be as great a hindrance
to court proceedings as a physical disturbance inside the court room. The
causal interpretation was therefore believed necessary to allow the courts
a method of speedy punishment whereby their business could be conducted
with as little interruption as possible., The belief rested on a supposed
foundation of history and inherency.8 Yet the instant decision is based on
true historical precedent and sound reasoning. Sir John Fox, by diligent
research into old English cases, has clearly shown that early courts did not
exercise a summary power over contempts committed out of court. 7 It is
equally clear that the intent of Congress, in passing Section 268, was to
limit the contempt power, for, at the time of its passage, the contempt
problem loomed large and Congress was fearful lest the summary power
be abused.8 Congress then, as the Supreme Court today, realized such
power to be necessary only for curbing disturbances interfering with actual
court room proceedings. Indirect contempts do not require a speedy disposition, and the time and trouble taken for punishment is often more
hindering than the contempt itself. Such acts are usually criminal in
nature and, as any crime, should be given a separate jury trial. Strict
construction is therefore desirable to limit a power which invades the constitutional guarantees of trial by jury, freedom from self incrimination,
double jeopardy, excessive punishments, and freedom of speech and press.,
It has been objected that the Supreme Court's interpretation of Section
268 is still tenuous since it restricts the summary power only to acts in the
vicinity of the court.'0 Yet, it would have been too concrete to have used
an exact geographic limitation. By using the words "in the vicinity" the
Court has left some discretionary power in the hands of the judges.""

Labor Law-Authority of N. L. R. B. to Order Employment with
Back Pay for Persons Refused Jobs Because of Union AffiliationsEmployer refused to hire two applicants for employment solely because of
their labor union affiliations. Held, (affirming N. L. R. B. order) such
refusal is an "unfair labor practice" under Section 8(3) of the Wagner
Act,' and rejected applicants must be employed with back pay. Phelps
Dodge Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 9 U. S. L. WEEK 4293 (U. S. 1941).
5. HERBERT BARRY, THE KING CAN Do No WRONG, AND OTHER PAPERS (1931)
194.

6. Myers v. United States, 264 U. S. 95, 103 (1924) ; Bessette v. W. B. Conkey
Co., 194 U. S. 324, 326 (19o4) ; WiLmoT, Nozs (1802) 254.
7. SIR JOHN FOX, CONTEMPT OF COURT (1927).
8. JOHN L. THOMAS, THE LAW OF CONSTRUCrivE CONTEMPT (1904) 174.

A later manifestation of Congressional opinion on the contempt problem is found
in the CLAYTON Acr, 38 STAT. 738 (914), 28 U. S. C. A. § 387 (1928), which assures
the accused, where the act of contempt is also a crime, of a jury trial. It is thus a
further limitation on the judiciary. The Act has been declared constitutional in
Michaelson v. United States, 266 U. S. 42 (1924).
9. CROMWELL HOLMES THOMAS, PROBLEMS OF CONTEMPT OF COURT (1934) 9.
Aside from this invasion of our constitutional guarantees there is the further obvious danger in the power of a judge to arraign a contemnor, try him without jury,
and place sentence upon him, especially when, in all probability, the judge is angered
and biased by the very contempt he is punishing.
1o. (1941) 54 HARV. L. Rv. 1397.
i. Warring v. Colpoys, io U. S. L. WEEK 2110 (App. D. C. 1941) has already
confirmed the decision in Nye v. United States, 313 U. S. 33 (1941).
1. 49

STAT. 449,

452 (935),

29

U. S. C. A. § I58 (3) (Supp.

1940).
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The instant case is a vindication of the position consistently maintained
by the N. L. R. B. since its creation,2 and a resolution of a square conflict

in the circuit courts.3 Section 8(3) of the Wagner Act defines an "unfair
labor practice" to be: "By discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of
employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization." The position of the
instant case that discriminatory refusal to hire is "discrimination in regard
to hire" is more in accord with the natural meaning of that language than
the opposite conclusion. 4 And so to hold promotes the declared policy of
the Act, defined by Section 1 5 to be "to eliminate the causes of certain
substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce . . . by encouraging
the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the
exercise by workers of full freedom of association." Industrial history
has proven discriminatory refusal to hire to be a cause of labor disputes
and a deterrent to labor organization.6 Furthermore the legislative history
of the Act indicates that Congress intended Section 8 to cover discriminatory refusal to hire. 7 The principal controversy in the case involved
the Board's authority to order employment with back pay of rejected
applicants. The Board derives its authority to take affirmative action from
Section IO(c) of the Act," which provides that if the Board finds that an
employer has committed an unfair labor practice, it "shall . . . issue an
order requiring such person . . . to take such affirmative action, including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate
the policies of this Act." This clause, considered on its language alone,
would seem to authorize an-v affirmative action which will effectuate the
policies of the Act, with the phrase "including reinstatement of employees . . ." serving merely as an illustration and not an extension or
limitation upon the authority. There are no convincing policy factors
which demand a more restrictive construction of the section, 9 and therefore
the literal construction, which the instant case adopts, is the proper one.
And the conclusion of the instant case that the exercise of the authority
in question will effectuate the policies of the Act is a sound one. To permit
such action by the Board is the only way to deter an employer from an
2. Waumbec Mills, Inc., 15 N. L. R. B. 37 (1939); Phelps Dodge Corp., ig N. L.
R. B. 547 (1940); Kelly-Springfield Tire Co., 6 N. L. R. B. 325 (1938); Alonquin
Printing Co., i N. L. R. B. 264 (1936).
3.N. L. R. B. v. Waumbec Mills, 1I4 F. (2d) 226, 231 (C. C. A. Ist, 1940) (held
in accord with instant case). Contra: Phelps Dodge Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 113 F. (2d)
202 (C. C. A. 2d, 194o); N. L. R. B. v. National Casket Co., 107 F. (2d) 992, 997
(C. C. A. 2d, 1939).
4. N. L. R. B. v. National Casket Co., ibid. In this case the phrase "discrimination in regard to hire" was construed to mean that an employer may choose whom he
will but may not, as a condition to accepting an applicant for employment, require him
to join or resign from a union.
5. 49 STAT. 449, § I (1935), 2'9U. S. C. A. § I51 (Supp. 1940).

6. See Justice Frankfurter's demonstration of this fact in the instant case at 4293.
7. Note (1940) Wis. L. REV. 44o, 442.
8. 49 STAT. 449, 454 (I935), 29 U. S. C. A. § 16o (c) (Supp. 194o).
9.But see Justice Stone's reasoning, in his dissenting opinion in the instant case
at 4298, that, in view of the traditional reluctance of the courts to compel performance,
of personal service contracts and the fact that the courts are given authority, without
any specified restriction thereon, to review and modify the Board's orders, an authority
to the Board to take affirmative action, without more, could not be construed to em"including reinstatement of employees
brace the authority in question; that ofthethephrase
Board's authority which likewise does not
." is therefore an enlargement
include the authority in question. To this argument it may be asked why should a
traditional judicial attitude as to a judicial power and the fact of judicial review of
Board orders control in construing the congressional intent in granting authority to
a newly-created administrative board.
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initial violation of the Act.10 This objective should certainly be regarded
as within the policy of the Act, particularly in view of the extent to which

employers might subvert the essential aims of the Act by delaying union
organization if they are permitted to commit this initial violation with
impunity. '
Labor Law-Effect of Collective Bargaining Contract on Jurisdiction of the N. L. R. B.-Employer,' in violation of collective bargaining contract, discharged employee active in union. The National
Labor Relations Board found employer's action to be an unfair labor practice (discrimination) prohibited by the Act. Board petitioned for enforcement of order of reinstatement and payment of back wages. Held (on
rehearing,2 one judge dissenting), despite existence of contract, Board is
empowered to prevent such unfair labor practice and in so doing may
enforce incidentally private rights. National Labor Relations Board v.
Newark Morning Ledger Co., 120 F. (2d) 262 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1941), 19
Ohio 0. 574.
The majority of the court felt that the problem in the instant case was
one of defining the objective of the National Labor Relations Act. These
judges concluded that a signed contract was not the sole aim of the Act
nor the final stage of collective bargaining, but that collective bargaining
included as well subsequent employer-employee relations; this view led
the court to term collective bargaining "a continuing process." 8 Judge
Clark, dissenting, maintained that "The matter is not one of an employee's right but of the forum for her remedy." 4 The judges constituting the majority do not hold that the problem is one of an employee's
right, for they maintain that the Board acts for the public 5 and aids the
IO.The cease and desist order is effective only to prevent violations after the
Board has heard a cause and found an employer to have committed an initial violation.
ii. Note (i94i) 89 U. oF PA. L. REv. 648, 65o, 654.
i. The term "employer" as used here shall refer to an employer engaged in interstate commerce and subject to the National Labor Relations Act.
2. It is interesting to note that less than three months after the original hearing
(Feb. 3, 1941) the Court reversed itself at a rehearing (April I7, I94I), at which
time Judge Mars again delivered the opinion for the Court. Of importance also
is the fact that the instant case is one dealing with a new problem of statutory construction as regards the National Labor Relations Act. The Board, however, has in
the past, in the following cases intervened, although a contract existed: Brown Shoe
Co., i N. L. R. B. 803, 829 (1936) ; Mass. Labor Relations Commission in re Shawsheen Dairy, Inc. and International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Stablemen
and Helpers of America, Local 477, 3 LAB. REL. REP. 377 (1938). The New York
courts, dealing with a similar Act, according to Judge Clark, have held that the
Board had no power "to abrogate any contract made by any two parties." United Baking Co. v. Bakery and Confectionery Workers' Union, Local 221, 14 N. Y. S. (2d)
74 (3d Dep't 1939). The contrary view was expressed in Bulkin et al. v. Sacks, 31

Pa. D. & C. 501 (1938). The Federal courts have stated, more directly, that certain
contracts could be declared void by the Board. National Licorice Co. v. National
Labor Relations Board, 309 U. S. 350 (1940); Ward, "Discrimination' Under the
National Labor Relations Board (1939) 48 YALE L. J. 1152, i198. "All . . . agree-

ments . . . will . . . be 'closely scrutinized' by the Board. . . . If the Board finds
that the agreement will not tend to effectuate the policies of the Act, no weight will
be given to the agreement."
3. National Labor Relations Board v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 12o F. (2d)
267 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941).
4. Id. at 269.
5. Amalgamated Utility Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, 3o9
U. S. 261, 266 (940).
In National Licorice Co. v. National Labor Relations Board,
309 U. S. 35o, 362 (194o), it is stated that "The Board acts in a public capacity to give
effect to the declared public policy of the act. .. "

io8

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

individual only incidentally. Moreover, it is discretionary with the Board
whether it wishes to intervene, 6 for the Board is not concerned with the
breached contract as such, but with unfair labor practices. Further, since
it is the Board, not the employee, that prosecutes, the problem cannot be
one of an employee's remedy. Judge Clark elaborates on his theme
by holding that "Their arguments [of the majority] may be paraphrased
thus . . . Discharging its members in sufficient quantities will destroy
any union. Ergo the Labor Board should have jurisdiction to prevent
such discharges. The non sequitur seems plain to the writer. Destruction
by unredressed discharge is inevitable. Destruction because the redress
is in one form and not another, is inconsistent with the meaning of the
word. If the remedy is there, a labor union is impervious." 7 Yet the
majority doesn't refer to destruction of unions, but follows the Act which
alludes merely to the encouragement or discouragement of "membership
in any labor organization." 8 It is thus not essential that a labor organization be on the brink of destruction before the Board will act. It seems
clear that the discriminatory discharge of an employee will tend to discourage unionism as much after as before the signing of a collective bargaining agreement.' Therefore such discouragement is as much prohibited
6. Ward, loc. cit. supra note 2.
7. National Labor Relations Board v. Newark Morning Ledger Co.,

12o

F. (2d)

262, 271 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941).
8. NATIONAL LABOR REILAtiONs Acr, 49 STAT. 449 (935), 29 U. S. C. A. § 158
(Supp. 1940). "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-

(3) By discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment . . . to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization."
The fact that the discharged employee may maintain a contract action on the
breached contract is no argument for depriving him of the benefit he would derive
incidentally when the Board acts. Were the Board not to act, the discharged employee
or the union would have to bring a contract action. This suit, among other disadvantages, would prove costly to the employee or the union.
9. WHITE, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF PuBLIc ADmINISTRATION (Rev. ed.
1939) 544; Pipin, Enforcement of Rights Under Collective Bargaining Agreement
(I939) 6 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 65o, 657: "The amount recoverable in a suit for darnages by an individual employee might often be small as compared with the cost of litigation. The employer knows this, and, if the employee is always compelled to resort
to an action at law he can very often be deprived of his rights." In the instant case,
Judge Clark, at p. 276, admits ".

.

. the administrative process

has the ad-

vantages of flexibility and familiarity." In Kirmise v. Adler, 311 Pa. 78, 83 (1933),
the court holds that "The questions arising from labor disputes have many times been
before the courts for solution, but . . . it is obvious that these tribunals should not be
the ones to decide them." In view of these facts, it might very well be conceived that
were the views of the dissenting judge accepted, employers would seek to evade the
jurisdiction of the Board by signing a contract and then doing as they willed. Of
course, they would risk contract suits, but the employer in the instant case was rash
enough to breach his contract. During the period intervening between the breach and
the trial, the employers, beyond reach of the Board, might try various means to undermine the unions so that by the time the trial came around, the labor organization,
especially if newly organized, may be destroyed or become very weak.
It must be remembered that when the individual or union sues, he or it bears most
of the cost, but when the Board acts, the Government bears the expense, except when
the union might desire to cooperate with the Board, as in the instant case. In such
event, some slight expense is entailed by the union.
Although the union may undertake the suit, the action of the employer, especially
if repeated, would still be a hindrance to the employees-collectively-and contrary to
the Act, which provides:
"Section 7. Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join or
assist labor organization.
Section 8. It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer(I) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 7." NATioNAL LABOR RELATIONs AcT, 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29
U. S. C. A.

§§

157-158 (Supp. 1940).
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by the Act in one case as in the other. 10 Apart from this consideration,
such controversy would hinder future collective bargaining, 1 by disturbing
the peaceful employer-employee relationship which the majority holds is
in itself part of the bargaining. The Act seeks to encourage collective
bargaining 12 and not merely to give labor a contract action; and a discriminatory discharge seems no less a hindrance to collective bargaining
(and as such an unfair practice prohibited by the Act) 1 after signing a
contract than before so doing.

Labor Law-Injunction Against Strike to Prevent Use of LaborSaving Device-Due to the prohibitive cost of transporting a grand opera
orchestra to small cities, plaintiff had utilized recorded music in several
presentations of Faust. To force plaintiff to abandon the use of recordings,
Musicians' Union induced Stagehands' Union to strike. The strike prevented plaintiff from operating its enterprise, and it sought an injunction.
Held (two judges dissenting),' injunction granted restraining both unions
from ordering or inducing a strike because of plaintiff's use of recordings.
Opera on Tour, Inc. v. Weber et al., 34 N. E. (2d) 349 (N. Y. C. A.
1941) .2

"Neither the common law nor the Fourteenth Amendment confers
4
the absolute right to strike." 3 The lawfulness of the means used, and of5
done.
damage
of
the
in
justification
be
proved
must
the objective sought
The courts have varied in their application of these tests.6 The tendency
10. NATIONAL LABoR RELATIONS ACT, 49 STAT. 449 (1935) 29 U. S. C. A. § i58
(Supp. 1940), cited note 8 supra.
ii. National Labor Relations Board v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 12o F. (2d)
262,

267 (C. C. A. 3d, i941).

12. NATIONAL

LAnoR RELATIONS AcT, 49 STAT. 449 (935),

29 U. S. C. A.

§ I51

(Supp. 1940).

13. Id. § 158 (I) ; "As I understand, if a collective bargaining contract is made,
the employer is expected to be bound by it and abide by it, and he would be guilty of
an unfair practice if he did not." Statement of Isadore Feibleman, Hearings before
Committee on Education and Labor on S. z958, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) 292.
i. In his vigorous dissent Mr. Chief Justice Lehman expressed the opinion that the
unions had a lawful objective within an area of economic conflict subject to intrusion
by the legislature alone, and that the case involved a "labor dispute" within the meaning of the NEv YORK CIvIL PRAcricE Acr § 876-a, subd. io (c).
2. For a discussion of the decision of the Appellate Division, 258 App. Div. 516,
I7N. Y. S. (2d) 144 (ist Dep't 1940) (3-2 decision), reversing the judgment of the
Special Term which had granted the injunction, see (1941) 39 MicH. L. Ray. 665,
(1940) 53 HARv. L. Rxv. 1054, and (940) I Am L. Ray. 172. The opinion of the
Special Term is found at 170 Misc. 272, ioN. Y. S. (2d) 83 (1939).
3.Mr. Justice Brandeis in Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U. S. 3o6, 311 (1926). Quoted
in Mason, The Right to Strike (1928) 77 U. OF PA. L. REy. 52.
4. The question of the lawfulness of the means used is not within the scope of
this note.
5.FRANK FRTER AND GraEA THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930) 5, 24-49. "
Prima facie, the intentional infliction of temporal damage is a cause of action, which,
as a matter of substantive law . . . requires a justification if the defendant is to
escape."

Mr. Justice Holmes in Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U. S. 194,

204 (904).

in § 775 uses the term "proper" rather than "lawful" in
stating what objectives are privileged.
6. Thus in Massachusetts the objective of compelling the reemployment of a discharged worker has been held unlawful. Mechanics Foundry and Mach. Co. v. Lynch,
236 Mass. 5o4, 128 N. E. 877 (1920). While in New York the objective of forcing a
theatre manager, who already had the number of employees he required, to employ
members of the defendant union as well has been held lawful. J. H. & S. Theatres,
Inc. v. Fay, 26o N. Y. 315, 183 N. E. 5o9 (1932). Similarly in Minnesota the objective of forcing a theatre manager to employ more musicians than he desired has
RESTATEMENT, TORTS (939)

Ho
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in New York has been to adopt a laissez faire attitude where the objective
of a strike involved economic benefit to the employees. 7 The basis of the
decision in the instant case is that a union's objective is unlawful if it
bears no reasonable relation to any condition of employment., Whether
abandonment of a labor saving device bears a reasonable relation to employment is debatable. The instant case held it did not." A desire on the part
of the court to confine lawful labor objectives within bounds narrower than
heretofore is apparent. The court's treatment of the anti-injunction provisions of the Civil Practice Act is also noteworthy.' 0 For, by stating that
there is no "labor dispute" where the strikers' objective bears no reasonable
relation to any condition of employment, 1 the court has converted these
provisions into a mere restatement of the common law privilege.' 2 To
been held lawful. Scott-Stafford Opera House Co. v. Minneapolis Musicians Ass'n,
118 Minn. 410, 136 N. W. lo92 (1912). Contraz: Haverhill Strand Theatre, Inc. v.
Gillen, 229 Mass. 413, i18 N. E. 671 (ii8). An authoritative analysis of Massachusetts law upon the subject is contained in FRANKFURTER AND GRaaN, op. cit. mtpra
note 5, at 24-46.
7. This was the attitude of the court in J. H. & S. Theatres, Inc. v. Fay, 26o N. Y.
315, 283 N. E. 509 (932),

cited note 6 mipra. Other examples of the New York policy

of noninterference are to be found in the cases of Stillwell Theatre, Inc. v. Kaplan,

259 N. Y. 405, 182 N. E. 63 (932); Bossert v. Dhuy, 221 N. Y. 342, 117 N. E. 582
(1917) ; National Protective Association of Steam Fitters & Helpers v. Cumming, 17o
N. Y. 325, 63 N. E. 369 (1902) (closed shop). Contra: Folsom v. Lewis, 2o8 Mass.

336, 94 N. E. 316 (1911). The New York courts have enjoined picketing where the
objective was to force employees upon one who employed none, as in Thompson v.
Boekhout, 273 N. Y. 390, 7 N. E. (2d) 674 (937),

or employed only members of his

own family, as in Luft v. Flove, ".7o N. Y. 640, 1 N. E. (2d) 369 (1936) ; but it appears that they may no longer do so in view of Wohl v. Bakery and Pastry Drivers
and Helpers Local 8o2 of International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 6I Sup. Ct. io8
(194)
(injunction restraining such picketing proscribed, as unconstitutional interference with right of free speech, on authority of American Federation of Labor v.
Swing, 312 U. S. 287 (94), 89 U. OF PA. L. REv. 825). Accord, People v. Muller
et al., 36 N. E. (2d) 2o6 (N. Y. C. A. 2942). The laissez faire attitude of the New
York court was described with particular clarity in the case of Interborough Rapid
Transit Co. v. Lavin, 247 N. Y. 65, 74,

259

N. E. 863, 866 (1928).

8. At 352 of the instant case the court states that the test of an objective's lawfulness is whether or not it bears a reasonable relation to wages, hours of employment,
health, safety, the right of collective bargaining, any other condition of employment,
or the protection of labor from abuses.
9. "For a union to insist that machinery be discarded in order that manual labor
may take its place and thus secure additional opportunity of employment is not a lawful labor objective." Instant case at 353.
IO. "No court

. . . shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or a

temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of a labor
dispute,

. . . except after findings of all the following facts

. . .: That no item

of relief granted prohibits directly or indirectly any person or persons from doing,
whether singly or in concert, any of the following acts: ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation of employment; . . . Advising, urging
or inducing without fraud, violence or threat thereof, others to do the acts heretofore
specified; . . . The term 'labor dispute' includes any controversy arising out of the
respective interests of employer and employee, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the relation of employer and employee." N. Y. Cirv. PRAC. Acr, Art.
51, § 876-a, subd. i (f) and IO (c). A collection of statutes similar to the New York
Act is contained in Note (1937) 16 N. C. L. REV. 235. See also (2938) 87 U. OF PA.
L. Riv. 235. In the case of May's Furs and Ready to Wear, Inc. v. Bauer, 282 N. Y.
331, 339, 26 N. E. (2d) 279, 282 (294o), Mr. Justice Finch (who wrote the majority

opinion in the instant case) stated: "It is indisputably clear that the existence or nonexistence of the employer-employee relation cannot be the factor by which to determine
the presence or absence of a labor dispute." Compare Baillis v. Fuchs, 283 N. Y. 133, 27
N. E. (2d) 812 (294o).
125

II.Instant case at 353.
12. See American Guild of Musical Artists, Inc. v. Petrillo, 36 N. E. (2d) 123,
(N. Y. C. A. 294i); People v. Muller et at., 36 N. E. (2d) 206, 207 (N. Y. C. A.

1941).
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cusses other judicial limitations upon the statute.

(1940)

§ 445, dis-
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III

evaluate the decision in the instant case without weighing policy factors
involved would be impossible.'8 On the exact facts of the case, plaintiff's
alternatives were to use recordings or to go out of business. Therefore,
the strike could advance the union's interests only by discouraging other
employers from installing labor saving devices. The possible effect of the
strike in advancing this interest must be compared to the adverse effect
which the strike was sure to have upon the interests of others concerned.Y4
Therefore, the result of the instant case appears correct. But the interests
of the strikers may outweigh those of the employer in some future case
involving a similar objective. Therefore, the court's wisdom in proscribing
such an objective may well be questioned.

Restraint of Trade-Labor Union's Attempt to Insure Union
Wages by Price-Fixing-Union and business association enter agreement which provides for fixing of minimum prices. Plaintiff member of
association sues to have agreement declared invalid. Held (one judge
dissenting), agreement invalid under anti-monopoly statute' which declares price-fixing in restraint of trade. Manhattan Storage and Warehouse Co. et al. v. Movers and Warehousemen's Ass'n of Greater New
York, Inc. et al., 28 N. Y. S. (2d) 594 (Ist Dep't, App. Div., 1941).2
Labor unions are given preferential treatment under anti-monopoly

statutes 3 so that they may effect their legitimate ends: improvement of
wages, hours, and working conditions. This agreement had as its objective
the assuring of a union wage but attempted to use minimum price-fixing
to effect that end. 4 The majority of the court frowned upon the agreement because of the price-fixing, declaring this not to be a legitimate labor
activity.' The dissenting judge thought the agreement was exempt from
all provisions of the anti-monopoly statute under a clause exempting "bona
13. "But in all such cases the ground of decision is policy; and the advantages to
the community, on the one side and the other, are the only matters really entitled to
be weighed." HOLMES, Privilege, Malice and Intent in COLLEcED LE.AL PAPERs
(1921) 117 at 130. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1939) in §§ 814, 942, recognizes that factors to be considered in regard to the advisability of granting injunctions against
strikes include the extent of the interests of the public as well as the extent of the
interests of the workers and employers. However, in his dissenting opinion in the
instant case, Mr. Chief Justice Lehman states at 358 that the courts have no power
to base their decisions upon the social consequences of workers' combinations to achieve
particular ends.
14. Had the injunction not been granted, the interest of society in having plaintiff perform in areas formerly untouched by the beneficial effects of grand opera would
have been dealt a mortal blow, as would the interest of plaintiff in operating its enterprise, the interest of plaintiff's actors and singers in continued employment, and the
interest of promoters in having plaintiff fulfill its bookings. Against these must be
weighed the union members' interest in being employed, and the extent of the chance
that this interest would be advanced.
I. NEW YORK GENERAL BUSINESs LAW § 340.
2. But cf. New York Clothing Manufacturers Exchange, Inc., et al. v. Textile Finishers Ass'n, Inc., et al., 238 App. Div. 444, 265 N. Y. Supp. 105 (1933); Barns v.
Dairymen's League Co-op. Ass'n, Inc., 22o App. Div. 624, 222 N. Y. Supp. 294 (4th
Dep't 1927).
3. GEN. LAvS OF CAL. (Deering, 1937) Act 87o2, § I3; CoLo. ANN. STAT. (Courtright's Mills, 1930) § 76o9a; Nmv YoRK GENERAL BUSINESS LAW § 340.
4. The prices were to be fixed by a stabilization committee.
5. The court relied in part on United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S.
I5o (940)
(A combination which controls a substantial portion of an industry and
regulates prices in interstate commerce in that industry is unreasonable per se within
meaning of the Sherman Act).
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fide labor unions"," and explained that the evidence showed that fixing of
minimum prices to prevent cut-throat competition among employers was
the only means of insuring to employees payment of union-scale wages.
Further, the interest of the public or consumer, which is imperiled when
union and employer cooperate, was not shown to have been adversely
affected. Price-fixing is employed as a means to bring about desired
ends. 7 Probably because it is ordinarily used as a means to bring .about
monopolistic control, the United States Supreme Court has declared unreasonable per se combinations of producers which fix prices., But the
courts, in the considering of union-employer agreements, should look at
the agreement's purposes and effects 9 to find whether the remedy has
healed the economic ailment. 10 No doubt the courts should be on guard
for labor racketeering 1 and conspiracies of union leaders and employers
designed to further monopolistic aims.' 2 Also the agreement's influence
upon the interests of the public or consumer should be evaluated. But to
ignore consideration of an agreement's purpose and results, and to look
only at the means employed is to beg the main issue. The result may be
as in the instant case, to declare an agreement in restraint of trade when
in fact it is in restraint only of chaotic competition.

Taxation-Taxability to Settlor of Income from Irrevocable
Trust Where He Retains Power to Vote Stock of the Corpus-Defendant created trust, income payable to his wife for life, then income and
principal to his children, retaining power to vote the stock, "alter or
amend" distribution of income and principal (except that trust could not
be revoked or revested in himself), direct disposition and reinvestment
of corpus, and remove the trustee bank. Reversing the Board of Tax
6. In American Fur Manufacturers Ass'n, Inc. v. Associated Fur Coat and Trimming Manufacturers, Inc., 164 Misc. 246, 291 N. Y. Supp. 61o (1936) the court said
that the exemption granted to bona fide labor unions-which became part of the act
by amendment in 1933-must be interpreted to include exemption from the provisions
of the entire statute, for otherwise the exception is superfluous under the common law.
7. "Economists have long deplored the fact that American procedures of trade
regulation are linked more intimately with legal traditions and precedents and the technical interpretation of the law than to economic appraisal. . . . The judiciary was
concerned with the specific methods and arrangements employed to achieve the end,
not the end itself." E. T. GRErxaa, PRIcE CONTROL (1939) 374.
8. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150 (1940) ; cf. Sugar Institute, Inc., et aL. v. United States, 297 U. S.553 (1935) ; United States v. Trenton
Potteries Co. et al., 273 U. S. 392 (1926).

q. "Before it (the court) will condemn, there must appear the elements of injury

to the public, or monopolistic control of a particular article of commerce, or unreasonable interference with and damage to the business of an individual, or the doing of
illegal or unconscionable acts, or specific intent to do injury to some one else, or, in
brief, at least some of the circumstances which would lead a court in good conscience

to say that a given set of defendants were overstepping the bounds of reasonable ambi-

tion and fair play and were becoming a nuisance to their fellow men." Barns v. Dairymen's League Co-op. Ass'n, 220 App. Div. 624, 640, 222 N. Y. Supp. 294, 307.

io. "For competition in turn to function in this way it would be necessary not only

that monopolistic influences be absent but also that everyone should know and follow
his interests and be able to protect them by bargaining on equal terms with his fellows.

Since, obviously, these conditions have not been and cannot be fulfilled and since we

would not be prepared to accept without modification the results of individualism even
if the conditions necessary for its satisfactory functioning were present, there is ground
for 'public interest' and, government interference in the conduct of business"' R. W.
Harbeson, The Public Interest Concept in. Law and in Economics (1938) 37 MICH. L.
REv. 181, 182.
ii.

Note (937)

12.

Note (1939) 39 COL.L. REV.291.

37 COL. L. REv. 993.

RECENT CASES

113

Appeals,1 the court held for plaintiff, taxing the settlor for the trust income
under Section 22 (a) of the Revenue Act of 1934 2 because of the control he retained over the corpus. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Buck, 12o F. (2d) 775 (C. C. A. 2d, 194).
The decision more firmly establishes the developing tax principle
that the government "may tax not only ownership, but any right or privilege that is a constituent of ownership." s The instant case applied the
doctrine of "substantial ownership" 4 for the first time against the settlor
of an irrevocable trust for life.5 The court was influenced by the economic
and social background of the defendant-settlor and mentioned that his wife
had personal property worth approximately a half million dollars, that the
family had an income in excess of normal needs, and that there was in
effect a mere reallotment of funds within the family group. The above
factors plus the settlor's control of the corpus-voting of the stock, sale
and reinvestment privileges-made "it impossible to conclude . . . that

the income is not taxable to him." The result is sound economically, for
a power of financial worth-control of the corpus-is the substance taxed, 6
but the technique is unsatisfactory, for a vague tax rule tends to increase
litigation and raise the cost of tax collection. This general interpretation
of Section 22 (a) is also undesirable from the taxpayer's viewpoint, for
they are unable to ascertain the tax consequence of their actions without
expensive judicial recourse to discover if they are on the "safe side" of
i. Ellsworth B. Buck, 41 B. T. A. 99 (194o). Thirteen members of the Board
agreed that Buck should not be taxed on the trust income under sections 166 or 167,
REVENUE Acr [48 STAT. 68o, 729 (934), 26 U. S. C. A. §§ 166 and 167 (194o)]. Section 166 relates to the taxability of the grantor for the trust income of a revocable

trust, and section 167 to the taxability of the grantor for the trust income when the income is accumulated for the benefit of the grantor. Five members dissented and wanted
to impose the tax, using sections 166 and 167 as their basis for authority. However,
not one official suggested extending the reasoning of Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S.
331 (1940) (a five year trust wherein grantor retained control similar to the instant
case) to a life trust, illustrating the area of doubt about that case as to whether the
factor of a short term trust or the control of the corpus was the decisive factor.
2. 48 STAT. 68o, 686 (1934), 26 U. S. C. A. § 22 (a) (1939). "22 GRoss INcomE.
(a) General Definition. 'Gross Income' includes gains, profits, and income derived
from salaries, wages, or compensation for personal service, of whatever kind and in
whatever form paid, or from professions, vocations, trades, businesses, commerce, or
sales, or dealings in property, whether real or personal, growing out of the ownership
or use of or interest in such property; also from interest, rent, dividends, securities, or
the transactions of any business carried on for gain or profit, or gains or profits and
income derived from any source whatever. . . !' (Italics supplied by author.)
3. Burnet v. Wells, 289 U. S. 670, 678 (933).
4. Caplin, Protecting a Grantor of a Shwrt Term Trust Against Taxation (194o)
I8 TAXES MAGAZINE 677, 682.
5. See Mortimer Stein, 41 B. T. A. 994 (1940). Trust deed with elements of control similar to instant case. The entire board--except author of majority opinion in
Ellsworth B. Buck, 41 B. T. A. 99 (I94O), cited note I supra-used Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S. 331 (1940), cited note I supra, as authority for taxing the grantor for
income of a life trust. This illustrates the rapidity with which the tax administrative
agency will adopt a new collection "weapon". On January 18, 194o, thirteen members
of the Board did not recognize the possibility that a trust which circumvented sections
166 and 167 and was not for a short term-Ellsworth B. Buck, supra-could be taxed
under section 22 (a). However, Helvering v. Clifford, supra, was decided February
26, 194o, and the Board by April 30, 194o-promulgation date of Mortimer Stein, supra
-had extended the "substantial ownership" doctrine from application to short term
trusts to the life term trust.
6. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Buck, 120 F. (2d) 775, 778 n. 2 (C. C. A.
2d, 1941). "We note, in passing, that Buck had expressly in mind the importance of retaining voting power in a considerable block of stock in conjunction with a small group
of persons who, together with him, were the dominant stockholders of the Wrigley
Co. It has often been observed (in economic treatises, government reports, based upon
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the "line." 7 Instead of tax administration being governed by inductive
rules gleaned from the adjudication of various factual situations there
should be a legislative enactment to define more sharply what incidents
of control will be sufficient to cause the settlor of a trust to be taxed for
the trust income. Legislative activity did solve the problem of tax evasion
by the use of the revocable trust and the trust by which funds were
accumulated for the benefit of the grantor; 8 and it can more efficiently
combat the present evasory technique of the tax-wise citizen.9

Torts-Proceedings before Administrative Agency as Basis for
Action for Malicious Prosecution-Defendant made sworn statements
to police officials which were the basis for proceedings resulting in refusal
on the part of District of Columbia authorities to renew the plaintiff's
license as a private detective. License was granted to plaintiff following
a hearing, whereupon plaintiff instituted suit for malicious prosecution.
Held, proceedings before an administrative agency can furnish basis for
this action. Pence v. Melvin, 38 F. Supp. 759 (D. C. D. C. i94i).
The action for malicious prosecution developed to protect the interest
in freedom from unjustifiable litigation. The rules governing the action
have evolved from a conflict between two important social interests, on
one hand the interest of society in effective enforcement of criminal law
by protecting persons who inform officials of crimes, and on the other
hand the interest of the individual in freedom from unjust criminal charges.1
Supplemental to this latter interest are the individual's interest in personal
reputation and financial integrity. 2 The scope of the action has been
greatly extended by this decision; the interests in reputation and financial
integrity have become the main interests protected. This extension has
its basis in the rapid growth of administrative bodies with powers bordering on the judicial. Some protection is needed against false and unfounded
charges before such boards,' and this case comprehends the need. Moreextensive investigations, and judicial decisions) that control of such a block yields corporate control from which in turn may flow numerous pecuniary emoluments of substance, to say nothing of more indirect 'satisfactions . . . of economic worth...."
7. See Mr. Justice Holmes, Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U. S. 625, 63o (1916). "We
do not speak of evasion because, when the law draws a line, a case is on one side of
it or the other, and if on the safe side is none the worse legally that a party has availed
himself to the full extent of what the law permits. When an act is condemned as an
evasion what is meant is that it is on the wrong side of the line indicated by the policy
if not the mere letter of the law."
8. See note i supra.
9.See Mr. Justice Roberts, dissenting in Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S. 331, 338
(194o). The dissent reviews the contest between the taxpayer and Congress in regard
to the revocable trust and the accumulation of trust income for the benefit of the
grantor and the satisfactory conclusion of the contest by means of legislation. See 2
BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRusTEEs (ist ed. 1935) §266; Paul, The Background of tlhe
Revenue Act of 1937 (1937) 5 U. OF CHr. L. REV. 41; Ray, The Income Tax on Short
Term and Revocable Trusts (i94o) 53 HAgv. L. REv. 1322.
i. RESTATEMENT, TORTS
:2.Ibid.

(938)

c. 29, Introductory Note.

3. Goodhart, Restatement of the Law of Torts, Voluine III: A Comparison of
American and English Law (94)
89 U. OF PA. L. REV. 265 at 297: "In view of the
rapidly growing number of such tribunals it is obvious that such a rule (RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1938) § 680) is desirable to protect persons who otherwise might have
no redress against a clear wrong."

RECENT CASES

over, it is important to note that here, as well as in the main supporting
case, 4 there is mention of the close analogy of the proceedings before the
boards to a criminal prosecution. The action taken by the administrative
agency is designed to protect the public rather than the individual, and
the proceedings are penal in nature, that is, plaintiff is deprived of license,
and his reputation injured. In this latter respect it is similar to the institution of proceedings of bankruptcy,5 lunacy,6 delinquency, 7 and contempt,8

all of which have been held by American courts to support an action for
malicious prosecution, although not criminal in nature. The Restatement
of Torts9 accepts the view that action for malicious prosecution will lie
0
if the plaintiff can show special damage resulting from such proceedings,
and can show that the administrative body had the power to hear facts
and reach judicial determination. The instant case follows this view.:"
However, the extension seems unwarranted; the action should be confined
within the scope established by precedent.' 2 Indeed it seems that the public
interest in efficient functioning of the board outweighs the plaintiff's interest in preserving his reputation from a stain which, if really serious, may
well be compensated for in an action for defamation.
4. National Surety Co. v. Page, 58 F. (2d) 145 (C. C. A. 4th, 1932).
5. Wilkinson v. Goodfellow-Brooks Shoe Co., 141 Fed. 218 (E. D. Mo. 195o).
6. Cragin v. Zabriskie, 12 N. Y. S. (2d) 871 (Sup. Ct. 1939), aff'd without ophliuM, 258 App. Div. 714, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 136 (ist Dep't 1939).
7. Lueptow v. Schroeder, 226 Wisc. 437, 277 N. W. 124 (1938).
8. Sebring v. Van Aker, 235 App. Div. 42o, 257 N. Y. Supp. 1O4 (4th Dep't 1932).
9. RESTATEmENT, TORTS (1938) § 68o.
I0. Such special damage may be the expense necessary to defend against unfavorable termination of the proceedings, or the harmful effect upon plaintiff's business
caused by the proceedings.
ii. Judge Page cites the RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 68o as authority for the decision.
12. The only case directly supporting the instant case is National Surety Co. v.
Page, 58 F. (:2d) 145 (C. C. A. 4th, 1932) ; ef. Cosulich v. Stempel, 81 Cal. App. 278,
253 Pac. 344 (1Q27); Fulton v. Ingulls, 165 App. Div. 323, 151 N. Y. Supp. 130 (2d
Dep't 1914). Contra: Raschid v. News Syndicate Co., Inc., 265 N. Y. 1, 191 N. E.
713 (933) ; Saigeru Hayashida v. Tsunehachi Kakimoto, 132 Cal. App. 743,23 P. (2d)
311 (i933).

